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Diameter Command Injection

Critical Risk
4G/5G Networks
Diameter Protocol
Technical Details
How Diameter Command Injection attacks work

Diameter Command Injection attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the Diameter protocol implementation to inject malicious commands or manipulate Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) in legitimate Diameter messages. These attacks can target various Diameter interfaces in 4G/5G networks, including S6a, S6d, S13, and Cx.

Attack Methodology

  1. Network Reconnaissance: Attackers identify Diameter nodes and interfaces in the target network.
  2. Message Interception or Crafting: Attackers either intercept legitimate Diameter messages or craft malicious ones from scratch.
  3. Command Injection: Malicious AVPs or commands are injected into Diameter messages.
  4. Message Delivery: The modified or crafted messages are sent to target Diameter nodes.
  5. Exploitation: The receiving node processes the injected commands, leading to unauthorized actions or system compromise.
Diameter Command Injection Attack Flow

Figure 1: Diameter Command Injection Attack Flow

Vulnerable Interfaces and Commands

InterfaceCommandInjection TargetPotential Impact
S6a (MME-HSS)Update-Location-Request (ULR)Subscriber-Status AVPUnauthorized service activation/deactivation
S6a (MME-HSS)Authentication-Information-Request (AIR)Requested-EUTRAN-Authentication-Info AVPAuthentication vector theft
Gx (PCEF-PCRF)Credit-Control-Request (CCR)Charging-Rule-Install AVPUnauthorized policy modification
Cx (I/S-CSCF-HSS)Server-Assignment-Request (SAR)Server-Assignment-Type AVPIMS service hijacking

Example Attack Scenario

1. Attacker crafts a malicious Update-Location-Request (ULR) with injected commands:

<diameter version="1.0">
  <header command_code="316" application_id="16777251" flags="request">
    <origin host="compromised-mme.operator.com" realm="operator.com" />
    <destination host="hss.operator.com" realm="operator.com" />
  </header>
  <avp code="1" name="User-Name" value="234150999999999" />
  <avp code="10415:1032" name="RAT-Type" value="1004" />
  <avp code="10415:1407" name="ULR-Flags" value="34" />
  <avp code="10415:1400" name="Subscriber-Status" value="0" />
  <!-- Injected malicious AVP -->
  <avp code="10415:1424" name="Access-Restriction-Data" value="0" />
</diameter>

2. The injected Access-Restriction-Data AVP removes all service restrictions for the subscriber, potentially allowing unauthorized access to premium services.

Impact Assessment

Diameter Command Injection attacks can have severe consequences for mobile network operators and subscribers:

Service Manipulation

  • Unauthorized service activation or deactivation
  • Modification of subscriber QoS profiles
  • Bypassing of service restrictions
  • Unauthorized access to premium services

Network Disruption

  • Denial of service for targeted subscribers
  • Overloading of network elements
  • Disruption of authentication processes
  • Interference with charging and billing systems

Security Compromise

  • Theft of authentication vectors
  • Subscriber impersonation
  • Bypass of security controls
  • Potential for persistent backdoor installation

Financial Impact

  • Revenue loss from service theft
  • Billing fraud
  • Regulatory fines for security breaches
  • Increased operational costs for incident response
Detection & Mitigation

Detection Methods

Detecting Diameter Command Injection attacks requires comprehensive monitoring and analysis of Diameter signaling traffic:

  • Deep Packet Inspection: Analyze Diameter messages to identify malformed or suspicious AVPs.
  • Behavioral Analysis: Monitor for unusual patterns in Diameter command usage or frequency.
  • AVP Validation: Check for unexpected or unauthorized AVPs in Diameter messages.
  • Command Sequence Analysis: Detect abnormal sequences of Diameter commands that deviate from expected protocol flows.
  • Origin Verification: Verify that Diameter messages originate from authorized and expected sources.

Key Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected AVPs in Diameter messages
  • Unusual combinations of AVPs or command codes
  • Diameter messages with inconsistent or contradictory AVPs
  • High frequency of specific Diameter commands from a single source
  • Diameter messages with modified mandatory AVPs
  • Unexpected changes to subscriber profiles or service settings
Standards & References
  • 3GPP TS 29.272Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management Entity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related interfaces based on Diameter protocol
  • RFC 6733Diameter Base Protocol
  • GSMA FS.19Diameter Interconnection Security
  • NIST SP 800-187Guide to LTE Security
Tools & Resources
  • 1
    Diameter Protocol FuzzerTool for testing Diameter implementations against malformed messages
  • 2
    Diameter Security ScannerSpecialized tool for identifying vulnerabilities in Diameter implementations
  • 3
    Wireshark with Diameter DissectorNetwork protocol analyzer with Diameter protocol support