Diameter Command Injection
Attack Vector Overview
Diameter Command Injection attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the Diameter protocol implementation to inject malicious commands or manipulate Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) in legitimate Diameter messages. These attacks can target various Diameter interfaces in 4G/5G networks, including S6a, S6d, S13, and Cx.
Attack Methodology
- Network Reconnaissance: Attackers identify Diameter nodes and interfaces in the target network.
- Message Interception or Crafting: Attackers either intercept legitimate Diameter messages or craft malicious ones from scratch.
- Command Injection: Malicious AVPs or commands are injected into Diameter messages.
- Message Delivery: The modified or crafted messages are sent to target Diameter nodes.
- Exploitation: The receiving node processes the injected commands, leading to unauthorized actions or system compromise.

Figure 1: Diameter Command Injection Attack Flow
Vulnerable Interfaces and Commands
Interface | Command | Injection Target | Potential Impact |
---|---|---|---|
S6a (MME-HSS) | Update-Location-Request (ULR) | Subscriber-Status AVP | Unauthorized service activation/deactivation |
S6a (MME-HSS) | Authentication-Information-Request (AIR) | Requested-EUTRAN-Authentication-Info AVP | Authentication vector theft |
Gx (PCEF-PCRF) | Credit-Control-Request (CCR) | Charging-Rule-Install AVP | Unauthorized policy modification |
Cx (I/S-CSCF-HSS) | Server-Assignment-Request (SAR) | Server-Assignment-Type AVP | IMS service hijacking |
Example Attack Scenario
1. Attacker crafts a malicious Update-Location-Request (ULR) with injected commands:
<diameter version="1.0"> <header command_code="316" application_id="16777251" flags="request"> <origin host="compromised-mme.operator.com" realm="operator.com" /> <destination host="hss.operator.com" realm="operator.com" /> </header> <avp code="1" name="User-Name" value="234150999999999" /> <avp code="10415:1032" name="RAT-Type" value="1004" /> <avp code="10415:1407" name="ULR-Flags" value="34" /> <avp code="10415:1400" name="Subscriber-Status" value="0" /> <!-- Injected malicious AVP --> <avp code="10415:1424" name="Access-Restriction-Data" value="0" /> </diameter>
2. The injected Access-Restriction-Data AVP removes all service restrictions for the subscriber, potentially allowing unauthorized access to premium services.
Diameter Command Injection attacks can have severe consequences for mobile network operators and subscribers:
Service Manipulation
- Unauthorized service activation or deactivation
- Modification of subscriber QoS profiles
- Bypassing of service restrictions
- Unauthorized access to premium services
Network Disruption
- Denial of service for targeted subscribers
- Overloading of network elements
- Disruption of authentication processes
- Interference with charging and billing systems
Security Compromise
- Theft of authentication vectors
- Subscriber impersonation
- Bypass of security controls
- Potential for persistent backdoor installation
Financial Impact
- Revenue loss from service theft
- Billing fraud
- Regulatory fines for security breaches
- Increased operational costs for incident response
Risk Factors
Detection Methods
Detecting Diameter Command Injection attacks requires comprehensive monitoring and analysis of Diameter signaling traffic:
- Deep Packet Inspection: Analyze Diameter messages to identify malformed or suspicious AVPs.
- Behavioral Analysis: Monitor for unusual patterns in Diameter command usage or frequency.
- AVP Validation: Check for unexpected or unauthorized AVPs in Diameter messages.
- Command Sequence Analysis: Detect abnormal sequences of Diameter commands that deviate from expected protocol flows.
- Origin Verification: Verify that Diameter messages originate from authorized and expected sources.
Key Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected AVPs in Diameter messages
- Unusual combinations of AVPs or command codes
- Diameter messages with inconsistent or contradictory AVPs
- High frequency of specific Diameter commands from a single source
- Diameter messages with modified mandatory AVPs
- Unexpected changes to subscriber profiles or service settings
- 3GPP TS 29.272Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management Entity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related interfaces based on Diameter protocol
- RFC 6733Diameter Base Protocol
- GSMA FS.19Diameter Interconnection Security
- NIST SP 800-187Guide to LTE Security
- 1Diameter Protocol FuzzerTool for testing Diameter implementations against malformed messages
- 2Diameter Security ScannerSpecialized tool for identifying vulnerabilities in Diameter implementations
- 3Wireshark with Diameter DissectorNetwork protocol analyzer with Diameter protocol support