Diameter Routing Manipulation
Attack Vector Overview
Diameter Routing Manipulation attacks target the routing infrastructure of Diameter networks, including Diameter Routing Agents (DRAs), Diameter Edge Agents (DEAs), and the routing tables within Diameter nodes. By manipulating routing information, attackers can redirect Diameter messages to unauthorized destinations, intercept sensitive traffic, or cause service disruption.
Attack Methodology
- Network Reconnaissance: Attackers identify Diameter routing infrastructure, including DRAs, DEAs, and routing policies.
- Routing Information Manipulation: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities to modify routing tables or inject false routing information.
- Traffic Redirection: Diameter messages are redirected to attacker-controlled nodes or unauthorized destinations.
- Message Interception or Modification: Intercepted messages can be analyzed for sensitive information or modified before forwarding.
- Attack Persistence: Sophisticated attackers may maintain persistent access to routing infrastructure for ongoing attacks.

Figure 1: Diameter Routing Manipulation Attack Flow
Routing Manipulation Techniques
Attackers manipulate the Destination-Realm AVP in Diameter messages to redirect traffic to unauthorized realms. This can be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in realm-based routing logic or by injecting false realm information into routing tables.
Attackers interfere with the Diameter peer discovery process by injecting false Capabilities-Exchange-Request/Answer (CER/CEA) messages, causing Diameter nodes to establish connections with unauthorized peers.
Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in Diameter Routing Agents to modify routing policies, allowing unauthorized access to protected networks or redirecting traffic to malicious endpoints.
Attackers modify the Route-Record AVPs in Diameter messages to manipulate the path that response messages will take, potentially allowing interception of sensitive information.
Example Attack Scenario
1. Attacker compromises a Diameter Edge Agent and modifies its routing table:
# Original routing entry Destination-Realm: operator.com Next-Hop: legitimate-dra.operator.com # Modified routing entry Destination-Realm: operator.com Next-Hop: malicious-node.attacker.com
2. Legitimate Diameter messages intended for operator.com are now routed through the attacker's node:
<diameter version="1.0"> <header command_code="316" application_id="16777251" flags="request"> <origin host="mme.visited.com" realm="visited.com" /> <destination host="" realm="operator.com" /> </header> <avp code="1" name="User-Name" value="234150999999999" /> <avp code="10415:1032" name="RAT-Type" value="1004" /> <avp code="10415:1407" name="ULR-Flags" value="34" /> </diameter>
3. The attacker's node can now intercept, analyze, or modify the message before forwarding it to the legitimate destination.
Diameter Routing Manipulation attacks can have significant impacts on network security, service availability, and subscriber privacy:
Traffic Interception
- Unauthorized access to subscriber data
- Interception of authentication vectors
- Exposure of subscriber identities and locations
- Compromise of subscriber privacy
Service Disruption
- Denial of service for targeted subscribers
- Routing loops causing network congestion
- Black-holing of Diameter messages
- Degradation of service quality
Security Bypass
- Circumvention of network security controls
- Bypass of Diameter firewalls
- Access to protected network segments
- Enablement of other attack vectors
Operational Impact
- Increased operational complexity
- Difficulty in troubleshooting routing issues
- Reduced network visibility
- Potential for persistent compromise
Risk Factors
Detection Methods
Detecting Diameter Routing Manipulation attacks requires comprehensive monitoring of routing infrastructure and traffic patterns:
- Routing Table Monitoring: Regularly audit and monitor Diameter routing tables for unauthorized changes.
- Traffic Analysis: Monitor Diameter traffic patterns to identify unexpected routing changes or traffic redirection.
- Route Record Verification: Verify that Route-Record AVPs in Diameter messages match expected routing paths.
- Peer Connection Monitoring: Monitor for unexpected or unauthorized Diameter peer connections.
- Configuration Change Detection: Implement change detection for DRA and DEA configurations.
Key Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected changes in Diameter routing tables
- Unusual Diameter peer connections
- Unexpected traffic patterns or routing paths
- Inconsistent Route-Record AVPs in Diameter messages
- Unexpected latency in Diameter message processing
- Diameter messages routed through unexpected networks or nodes
- RFC 6733Diameter Base Protocol
- GSMA FS.19Diameter Interconnection Security
- 3GPP TS 29.272Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management Entity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related interfaces based on Diameter protocol
- ENISA Technical GuidelineSecurity measures for Diameter signaling
- 1Diameter Route AnalyzerTool for analyzing and validating Diameter routing configurations
- 2Diameter Security ScannerSpecialized tool for identifying vulnerabilities in Diameter implementations
- 3Wireshark with Diameter DissectorNetwork protocol analyzer with Diameter protocol support